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Abstract
Recently, models of evolution have begun to incorporate structured popu-
lations, including spatial structure, through the modelling of evolutionary
processes on graphs (evolutionary graph theory). One limitation of this oth-
erwise quite general framework is that interactions are restricted to pairwise
ones, through the edges connecting pairs of individuals. Yet many animal
interactions can involve many players, and theoretical models also describe
such multi-player interactions. We shall discuss a more general modelling
framework of interactions of structured populations with the focus on com-
petition between territorial animals, where each animal or animal group has
a “home range” which overlaps with a number of others, and interactions
between various group sizes are possible. Depending upon the behaviour
concerned we can embed the results of different evolutionary games within
our structure, as occurs for pairwise games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma
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or the Hawk-Dove game on graphs. We discuss some examples together with
some important differences between this approach and evolutionary graph
theory.
Keywords: structured populations, evolution, game theory, territory
1. Introduction1
1.1. Modelling structured populations2
Recently, models of evolution have begun to incorporate structured pop-3
ulations using evolutionary graph theory [1, 2]. These models embed stan-4
dard games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, or the Hawk-Dove game within5
a graph structure [3, 4, 5]. One limitation of this otherwise quite general6
framework is that interactions are restricted to pairwise ones, through the7
graph edges despite the fact that animal interactions can involve many play-8
ers. Thus the models may be appropriate for some special situations, such9
as territorial animals with non-overlapping territories, but not the fluid sit-10
uations with multiple overlaps that we describe below. The same applies to11
the related concept of cellular automata see e.g. [6, 7, 8].12
In this paper we discuss a more general framework of interactions of struc-13
tured populations focusing on competition between territorial animals. We14
can embed the results of different evolutionary games within our structure,15
as occurs for pairwise games on graphs. Graph models have three elements:16
graph, game and dynamics. We can use the dynamics (almost) unchanged,17
see the discussion in Section 6, once we have evaluated the fitnesses of the18
individuals using the underlying game and structure. However, a more gen-19
eral mode of interaction is needed, as well as the possibility of involving20
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multi-player games. Our method in general allows for this extra flexibility.21
1.2. Animal groups and territoriality22
Animals of many species live alone or in distinct groups on a (reasonably)23
well-defined territory, and they forage for food almost exclusively within that24
territory. Similarly, it may be that the males of the species occupy territories25
for the purposes of mating. In either case, territories will often be defended26
against rivals and so interactions occur at the boundaries of territories. In27
this scenario, we can think of non-overlapping areas with interaction only at28
the borders.29
However, it is often the case that the area that an animal or animal group30
uses for foraging is not in fact exclusive to itself, but can overlap considerably31
with the territories of others. In this case the more general term home range32
[9] is used for the area that an individual or group utilises. Thus there will33
be parts of the environment that are utilised by two or more individuals or34
groups and there can be interactions between these groups when they meet.35
Such interactions may occur just when the groups meet, or a meeting and36
competition may be caused by the presence of major items of food. We note37
that even when territories are non-overlapping, intrusion into the territory38
of others can still cause these types of interaction.39
A good example of this phenomenon occurs in the case of the African40
wild dog. Woodroffe [10], [11] describe aspects of the territorial behaviour41
of wild dogs. The size of home ranges varies considerably from site to site,42
ranging from 500 square kilometres up to over 1500 square kilometres. In fact43
these areas vary in size throughout the year as well; for instance packs use44
much smaller areas when they are feeding pups at a den. Across different45
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sites, with such large home ranges, a common feature is significant home46
range overlap, where there can be interactions between different dog packs.47
Ginsberg & Macdonald [12] measured a home range overlap from 50% to48
80%. The size of the regions of interaction can vary throughout the year,49
and the environment and the likelihood of interactions are thus very fluid.50
Other examples of animals using overlapping home ranges include chee-51
tahs [13], roadrunners [14], caracara [15], woodchuck [16], chimpanzees [17]52
and lynx [18]. In some cases many groups can interact at significant food53
sources, and often food loss to neighbours can be considerable [19].54
1.3. Outline of the paper55
In the following sections we shall outline the model framework in its56
full generality before focusing on some example population structures which57
illustrate how the model may be applied. The first of these applications58
considers a simple model of animal interactions where territories are distinct.59
For example, we shall see in Figure 2 in Section 3.1 two alternative ways to60
view the model; the natural way involving real space, and a more general61
graphical representation. We repeat this process with the other examples as62
well. We then consider an example involving a particular evolutionary game,63
and come to some conclusions about the influence of the population structure64
on the outcome of the game. This is followed by a discussion of our results,65
and ideas for how to develop this work.66
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2. The model framework67
2.1. The population and its distribution68
We consider a population of N individuals I1, . . . , IN who can move be-69
tween and potentially interact at M distinct places P1, . . . , PM . Let X(t) =70
(Xn,m(t)) be a binary N ×M matrix representing the presence of individual71
In at place Pm; i.e.72
Xn,m(t) =


1, if In is at place Pm at time t,
0, otherwise.
(1)
The nth row of X, (Xn,◦) represents individual In and the m
th column of X,73
(X◦,m) represents place Pm. As a whole, X(t) represents the distribution of74
the population over the whole habitat (all of the places) at time t. We use75
a matrix representation instead of a single vector with N elements (where76
the nth value would be the position of In) in order to talk more easily about77
probability distributions of the position of In.78
In general the probability of X(t) taking any particular value x = (xn,m)79
may depend upon the entire history of the system x<t = (x1,x2, . . . ,xt−1).80
We write this conditional distribution as81
P (X(t) = x)(x<t) = P (X(t) = x|X(1) = x1, . . . ,X(t− 1) = xt−1). (2)
Individuals have to be at some place, and since they cannot be at two places82
at the same time (places are distinct), at any time every row of X contains83
exactly one 1, and there is a unique distribution of the population over the84
places. This gives the following85
∑
x
P (X(t) = x)(x<t) = 1 ∀t,x<t. (3)
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Let pn,m,t(x<t) = P (Xn,m(t) = 1)(x<t) denote the probability of individ-86
ual In being in place Pm at time t given the history of the system x<t. For87
any given individual, we thus have88
∑
m
pn,m,t(x<t) = 1 ∀n, t,x<t. (4)
It may be that not all individuals can go to all places, and that each89
individual In has a subset of the overall set of places Pn available to it. A90
home range or territory of individual In is defined by91
Pn = {Pm; pn,m,t(x<t) > 0 for some t and some history x<t} (5)
i.e. is the set of places that In has a non-zero probability of visiting at some92
point.93
In our general framework the whole population follows a single random94
process, which can depend upon its entire history. This would be very com-95
plex, and perhaps not very realistic, and there are a number of simplifications96
that we can make based upon different types of independence, some of which97
we discuss in Appendix A. We consider two important concepts only here.98
It may be that a given population distribution is independent of the99
history of the process so that100
P (X(t) = x)(x<t) = P (X(t) = x). (6)
In this case we call the model history-independent.101
If the process satisfies102
pn,m,t(x<t) = pn,m ∀n,m, t,x<t (7)
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P1 P2 Pm
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Pm−1 Pm+1 PM−1 PM
pn,m
pn,m+1
pN,M−1
pN,M
p1,1
p1,m−1
p2,2
p2,1
Figure 1: Representing an independent model as a bipartite graph where the weight
between the vertex representing individual In and place Pm is pn,m.
we simply call the model independent and can think of it in terms of a bi-103
partite graph as in Figure 1. In Appendix A we discuss some intermediate104
cases between history independence and (full) independence.105
2.2. Fitnesses106
To model the evolution of a population, we must evaluate the fitnesses107
of the individuals. In general the fitness of each individual depends upon108
which place(s) it visits, which other individuals also visit the same place,109
and possibly even which individuals visit which other places (e.g. if others110
deplete resources which it might wish to use later). In general the reward for111
individual In at time t given the current distribution of individuals X(t) = x112
and the historical distributions x<t will be denoted by R(n,x, t,x<t).113
The reward to an individual will in general be a weighted combination114
of contributions from a succession of time points. Here we shall consider115
cases where only the current distribution affects the reward. In such a case116
the history can be ignored, and as we are only evaluating the fitness at117
a snapshot in time, the time index is not strictly necessary either, and so118
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the reward to In thus becomes R(n,x). Note that if fitness did directly119
depend on time, and not just through how time affected the distribution120
of individuals, and we had to evaluate fitness at different time points e.g.121
to update the population composition through evolutionary dynamics, then122
the explicit inclusion of time would still be necessary. We also note that123
for homogeneous history independent processes this is entirely equivalent to124
more general reward functions, since in this case R(n,x, t,x<t) ≡ R(n,x).125
Perhaps the most natural reward function, and the one that we will gen-126
erally use, is the mean reward, which we label Rn where127
Rn =
∑
x
P (X = x)R(n,x). (8)
If xn,m = 1, then individual In is at place Pm in the group G of individuals128
129
G = {Ij; xj,m = 1}. (9)
Let P (X◦,m = χG)(x<t) be the probability of group G meeting at place Pm130
at time t, given the history x<t. Assuming our model is row-independent i.e.131
players move independently of each other (see Appendix A), we obtain132
P (X◦,m = χG)(x<t) =
∏
j∈G
pj,m,t(x<t)
∏
j /∈G
(1− pj,m,t(x<t)). (10)
For the independent model, this becomes133
P (X◦,m = χG) =
∏
j∈G
pj,m
∏
j /∈G
(1− pj,m). (11)
Often the reward to an individual will only depend upon the place that134
it occupies and the group of individuals at that place. We label such payoffs135
8
as direct group interaction payoffs, and in such cases136
R(n,x) = R(n,m, χG) (12)
where R(n,m, χG) is the reward to In at place Pm occupied by group G and137
then138
Rn =
M∑
m=1
∑
G
P (X◦,m = χG)(x<t)R(n,m, χG). (13)
3. Example models139
3.1. Territorial interaction model140
Here we introduce a general model of interactions within a population141
with overlapping territories, and illustrate it with a simple example. Consider142
the scenario in Figure 2a) where there are three individuals I1, I2, I3 and143
each one of them can move freely within a territory in the shape of a square.144
The individuals’ territories overlap, creating six distinct places P1, . . . , P6.145
Assuming the territories are relatively small and that individuals roam freely146
and randomly, we may assume that at any given time, the probability of an147
individual being at a place within its own territory is proportional to the148
area of the place. We thus get an independent model with149
(pn,m) =


1
2
1
4
1
4
0 0 0
0 0 1
4
1
2
1
4
0
0 1
4
1
4
0 1
4
1
4

 . (14)
We get, for example, that all of the individuals can be together only at place150
P3 and, by (11), that happens with probability p1,3p2,3p3,3 =
1
64
. Also, a151
group G = {I1, I3} can meet either on P2 or P3 and we get,152
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P1
P2 P3 P4
P5P6
I1
I2
I3
I1
I2
I3
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
a) b)
1
2
1
2
1
4 1
41
41
4
1
4
1
4 1
4
Figure 2: Territorial interaction model. a) The territory of individual I1 is the square in
grey, the territory of I2 is the square encompassed by the dotted lines, the territory of I3
is the square encompassed by full lines; b) is the corresponding graphical representation
as a general independent model.
P (X◦,2 = χG) = p1,2p3,2 =
1
16
, (15)
P (X◦,3 = χG) = p1,3p3,3(1− p2,3) =
3
64
. (16)
3.2. The boundary interaction model153
We similarly introduce a general model of interactions within a popula-154
tion with non-overlapping territories, and illustrate it with a simple exam-155
ple. Consider the scenario in Figure 3a) where there are four individuals156
I1, I2, I3, I4 and each one of them can move freely within an area in the157
shape of a regular hexagon; guarding the boundaries of their own area. An158
interaction between individuals can thus occur only at the boundaries and159
assuming the presence of an individual at a particular boundary segment is160
proportional to the length of the segment relative to the total length of the161
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I2
I1
I3
P{1,2}
I2I1
I3
I1
I2
I3
2
3
1
3
a) b) c)
P{2,3}
P{1,3}
P{1,2}
P{2,3}P{1,3}
P{1,3}
P{2,3}
P{1,2}
I4
P{2,4}
P{3,4}
I4
P{2,4}
P{3,4}1
2
1
2
2
4
1
4
1
4
1
3
1
3
1
3
I4
P{3,4}
P{2,4}
Figure 3: The boundary interaction model. a) Individuals are guarding their areas; b)
is the corresponding graphical representation as a general independent model; c) is an
alternative visualization as pairwise interactions on graphs.
guarded boundary, we get that the interactions can only be pairwise with162
the corresponding pn,m given below. We get163
(pn,{i,j}) =


2
3
1
3
0 0 0
2
4
0 1
4
1
4
0
0 1
3
1
3
0 1
3
0 0 0 1
2
1
2


. (17)
In general, we consider a graph with I1, . . . , IN as individuals on vertices,164
and places as edges, as shown on Figure 3c). Any place can contain at most165
two individuals and there are M = N(N − 1)/2 places, some of which may166
be empty with probability 1, if the edge does not exist on the graph. We167
write P{n,n′} for a place at the edge between individuals In and I
′
n.168
In Appendix B we discuss the reward function for the boundary inter-169
action model, and discuss some potentially important consequences for the170
evaluation of reward functions for evolutionary games on graphs.171
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P1
P2 P3
P4
P3 P1P2P4
I1I2I3I4
λ
µ
λ λ
1−λ
1−λ
1−λ
1−µ
3
1−µ
3
1−µ
3
a) b)
I1
I2 I3
I4
c)
Figure 4: The territorial raider model. a) Individual In lives in place Pn but can raid
neighbouring places. The territory of I1 is the whole triangle and the home place is the
central smaller triangle. The territory of I2 is the rhombus encompassed by full lines,
the territory of I3 the rhombus encompassed by dotted lines and the territory of I4 the
rhombus encompassed by dashed lines; b) is the corresponding graphical representation
as a general independent model; c) is an alternative visualization as some multi-player
interactions on a graph.
3.3. The territorial raider model172
Now, consider a special case of the territorial interaction model. As-173
sume that there are N individuals I1, . . . , IN each living in their own place174
P1, . . . , PN . The individuals can also move to one of the places neighbouring175
theirs. Such a situation with N = 4 is shown in Figure 4a).176
This can be modelled by a graph (V,E), where the vertices represent both177
the individuals as well as the places of interactions. We again let A be the178
adjacency matrix of the graph. An individual can stay at its own place or it179
can move and raid one of the neighbouring places. For example, consider a180
star graph with node I1 in the centre, and N − 1 leaf nodes I2, . . . , IN (see181
Figure 4c).182
Suppose that for each individual on a leaf, the probability that they go to183
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the centre is λ, and so the probability that they stay on a leaf is 1− λ, and184
that the probability that the individual from the centre stays in the centre185
is µ, it going to each leaf with equal probability (1− µ)/(N − 1) otherwise.186
We get187
(pn,m) =


µ 1−µ
N−1
1−µ
N−1
. . . 1−µ
N−1
λ 1− λ 0 . . . 0
λ 0 1− λ . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
λ 0 0 . . . 1− λ


. (18)
An individual from the leaf can be in the following groups:188
• alone (either on the leaf or in the centre),189
• with the centre individual only (either on the leaf or in the centre),190
• with the centre individual and k others (in the centre); there are
(
N−2
k
)
191
such distinct groups,192
• without the centre individual but with k others (in the centre); there193
are
(
N−2
k
)
such distinct groups.194
The respective probabilities of seeing such a group are as follows:
P (G = {In}) = λ(1− µ)(1− λ)
N−2 +
(
1−
1− µ
N − 1
)
(1− λ), (19)
P (G = {I1, In}) = λµ(1− λ)
N−2 +
1− µ
N − 1
(1− λ), (20)
P (G = {I1, In} ∪ {k > 0 others}) =
(
N − 2
k
)
λµ(1− λ)N−2−kλk, (21)
P (G = {In} ∪ {k > 0 others from the leaves}) =
(
N − 2
k
)
λ(1− µ)(1− λ)N−2−kλk.
(22)
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An individual from the centre can be in the following groups:195
• alone (either in the centre or on one of the leaves),196
• with one other individual, either in the centre or on one of the leaves;197
there are N − 1 distinct pairs for each of these two possibilities,198
• with k > 1 others (in the centre); there are
(
N−1
k
)
such distinct groups.199
The prospective probabilities thus become
P (G = {I1}) = µ(1− λ)
N−1 + (1− µ)λ, (23)
P (G = {I1} ∪ {one other}) = (N − 1)
(
µ(1− λ)N−2λ+
1− µ
N − 1
(1− λ)
)
,
(24)
P (G = {I1} ∪ {k > 1 others}) =
(
N − 1
k
)
µ(1− λ)N−1−kλk. (25)
If E(n) denotes the mean size of the group where In is, we get from above200
that201
E(n) =


2− λ− µ+ λµN, for the centre individual; (n = 1)
1 + λµ+ (N − 2)λ2 + (1−λ)(1−µ)
N−1
, for a leaf individual; (n > 1).
(26)
For fixed λ and µ and any 2 ≤ n ≤ N , we get that the ratio E(n)/E(1) tends202
to λ/µ in the limit N →∞. When λ = 1/2 and µ = 1/N , we get203
E(n)
E(1)
=
N2 + 2N + 4
4(2N − 1)
≈
N
8
, for large N . (27)
Numerical values for a specific example are shown in Table 1.204
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i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 E[|G|]
Focal from leaf 0.45 0.2625 0.1875 0.0875 0.0125 1.95
Focal from centre 0.4125 0.45 0.075 0.05 0.0125 1.8
Average 0.4425 0.3 0.165 0.08 0.0125 1.92
Table 1: Numerical values of P (|G| = i) and expected group size E[|G|] on the star for
N = 5, λ = 1/2 and µ = 1/5. The randomly selected individual has probability of 1/5 of
being in the centre which gives the values for the average individual.
4. The role of strategy and example games205
In general, we would often find the distribution of groups as above, then206
play the game within each possible group. Thus if we can define the payoffs207
in any given mixture of individuals, we can find the payoffs in the overall208
game. This is the scenario in our first example. It is possible also that how209
individuals move between places is a strategic decision, and we explore this210
possibility in our second example.211
4.1. A multi-player Hawk-Dove game in the territorial raider model212
We consider a multi-player game with Hawks and Doves, competing for213
a single reward. If all individuals in a fighting group are Doves, they split214
the reward, so each receives the reward divided by the number in the group.215
If there are any Hawks, all the Doves flee and get 0, all the Hawks fight and216
one of them receives the reward, and all of the others receive a cost C. Thus217
if we denote RDd,h(R
H
d,h) as the reward for a Dove (Hawk) in a group with d218
other Doves and h other Hawks, we get219
15
RDd,h =


0; if h > 0
V
d+1
; if h = 0
(28)
RHd,h =
V − hC
h+ 1
. (29)
Thus this situation is an example of direct group interaction payoffs intro-
duced in Section 2.2, since the behaviour of individuals outside the group has
no effect on the fitness of group members. We suppose that all individuals
play a mixed strategy with probability α of playing Hawk (and so probability
1 − α of playing Dove). Thus conditional upon the size of the group being
k + 1 the number of Hawk groupmates an individual will have follows a Bi-
nomial distribution with parameters k and α, so that the probability that an
individual will have h Hawk and d = k − h Dove groupmates is given by
(
k
h
)
αh(1− α)k−h.
The expected payoff for Dove (ED) and for Hawk (EH) are thus given by220
ED(α) =
N−1∑
d=0
N−1−d∑
h=0
P (|G| = d+ h+ 1)
(
d+ h
h
)
αh(1− α)dRDd,h (30)
=
N−1∑
d=0
P (|G| = d+ 1)(1− α)d
V
d+ 1
, (31)
EH(α) =
N−1∑
d=0
N−1−d∑
h=0
P (|G| = d+ h+ 1)
(
d+ h
h
)
αh(1− α)d
V − hC
h+ 1
. (32)
Let us now consider this game on the star with N = 5, λ = 1/2 and221
µ = 1/5, V = 1 and C = 2 as described in Table 1. In particular we shall222
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assume a large population consisting of many identical star structures, with223
mixing over time. We seek the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) value of224
α where the payoff EH(α) for playing Hawk is the same as the payoff ED(α)225
for playing Dove. It should be noted that we have assumed that individuals226
do not distinguish between whether their home vertex was the centre or a leaf227
when choosing their strategy; if they did so we would have an asymmetric228
contest which would be significantly more complicated (there would be two229
distinct roles here for the star, but in general there could be many roles). We230
further note that to consider evolution on a finite population fully, we would231
need to explicitly consider the dynamics of the process, which is outside the232
scope of this paper. Since, by (31)-(32) and the values in Table 1,233
EH(α)− ED(α) = 0.33− 1.05α + 0.35α
2 − 0.0675α3 + 0.005α4 (33)
we get that α = 0.353 is the only root of (33) in the allowable interval [0, 1].234
Furthermore the derivative of the right-hand side of (33) with respect to α235
is negative, so α = 0.353 is the unique ESS.236
4.2. The territorial raider model with strategic movement237
Consider a territorial raider model, so that a graph G = (V,E) is given,238
individuals live at places Pm and can either stay in their own place or visit239
a neighbouring place. Consider a regular graph with every vertex having240
degree d. Suppose that individuals play a strategy where they stay at their241
home place with probability 1 − p and move to each of the neighbouring242
places with equal probability p/d. Thus here strategy affects the movement243
of individuals and the distribution of the population over the places, but it244
does not affect the payoffs conditional on this distribution. This is the reverse245
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Symbol Meaning
BH the benefit of foraging at its home place,
BI the benefit of foraging at any of its neighbours’ place,
LH cost per foreign forager at its place when it is at home,
LI cost per foreign forager at its place when it is at a neighbouring place,
FH cost per fight when at its home place,
FO cost of a fight against the owner of a place,
FI cost of a fight for each other intruder of the neighbour.
Table 2: Notation for the costs and benefits in the the territorial raider model with strategic
movement.
of the previous example, where the strategy affected the payoffs but not the246
population distribution. It is of course possible for strategies to affect both247
the population distribution, and the payoffs conditional on this distribution.248
Let us assume that all but one individual plays p and find the optimal249
strategy for our focal individual. We look for values of p such that p is the250
best choice of our focal individual in a population of p-players. In order to251
determine the rewards to the individual, we will use a cost-benefit model,252
R = B − C, where benefits come from foraging at a particular place and253
costs come to an individual in two forms - direct costs from (potential) fights254
with others trying to forage at the same place and indirect costs from having255
its home place foraged by others. The notation for this model is summarised256
in Table 2.257
If our individual stays at home, it will get a benefit BH but will have to258
fight and the place will be depleted by on average d·p/d = p other individuals.259
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The expected reward will thus be260
EHome = BH − p(FH + LH). (34)
If our individual goes to a neighbouring place Pm, it will get the benefit BI .261
There will be on average (d − 1) · p/d other intruders in Pm and the owner262
will also be there with probability (1 − p); our focal individual will have to263
fight with all of them. There will still be on average d · p/d = p individuals264
coming to its home; it will not fight with them but will pay the indirect cost265
LI per individual. Thus, the expected reward when leaving the home place266
is267
EIntrude = BI − pLI − p
d− 1
d
FI − (1− p)FO. (35)
We see that this situation is not an example of direct group interaction268
payoffs, since the fitnesses of individuals within the group can be affected by269
those outside of the group. The difference between the payoffs from staying270
or intruding in a population where everybody else intrudes with probability271
p is272
f(p) = EHome − EIntrude (36)
= (BH − BI) + FO − p
[
(LH − LI) + FH + (FO − FI) +
1
d
FI
]
(37)
We can now perform the ESS analysis. If273
0 < f(0) = (BH − BI) + FO (38)
then staying at home is the best response to everybody staying at home.274
Note that typically FO > 0. However, it may still be that BH − BI < 0275
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because an individual may be careful not to over-harvest its own place, but276
may not mind over-harvesting neighbouring places when on them. On the277
other hand, if278
0 > f(1) = (BH − BI)− (LH − LI)− (FH − FI)−
1
d
FI (39)
then always intruding is an ESS. When neither (38) nor (39) holds, then279
there is a mixed ESS p ∈ (0, 1) given by280
p =
(BH − BI) + FO
(LH − LI) + FH + (FO − FI) +
1
d
FI
. (40)
It is clear that if (38) and (39) do not hold then the numerator and the281
denominator of (40) are negative. Conversely if they are both positive then282
there is an unstable equilibrium and both (38) and (39) hold so that all283
staying at home and all intruding are both pure ESSs.284
Also, note that whether (39) holds depends on d. The only effect of d285
is on the contribution from FI ; the larger the degree of the graph, the more286
likely that other intruders will have to be fought. It is reasonable to assume287
that FI > 0, and so the larger d, the less attractive intruding is. It may288
thus happen that intruding is an ESS when d is small but it is not an ESS289
when d is large (even if the other parameters stay the same), see Figure 5a).290
When there is a mixed ESS, from (40), increasing d decreases the probability291
of intruding at the ESS, see Figure 5b). Similarly when there are two pure292
ESSs the threshold value of the unstable equilibrium increases.293
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Figure 5: Graphs of f(p) from (37) for varying d. In a), BH −BI = 1, FO = 3, LH −LI =
0, FH − FI = 0, FI = 3 and d = 2 (bottom line), d = 4, 6 (middle lines) and d = 8 (top
line); here p = 0 is always ESS, p = 1 is ESS only if d < 3. In b) BH − BI = −2, FO =
1, LH − LI = −2, FH − FI = −1, FI = 5 and d = 2 (bottom line), d = 4, 6 (middle lines)
and d = 8 (top line); here p = 0 is never ESS, p = 1 is ESS only if d ≤ 5 and there is a
mixed ESS for d > 5.
5. Comparing place structures294
5.1. Fair comparisons295
We are particularly interested in seeing how (if at all) different place296
structures can affect payoffs. Payoffs are usually dependent on the type of297
interactions in the population, and this in turn depends on the possible group298
sizes. Hence, if the group sizes vary between two given different structures,299
we expect the payoffs to vary as well.300
However, we also want to know whether the structure influences the pay-301
offs in some other way as well. We take the approach of comparing a given302
place structure with an appropriate well-mixed population. This would then303
allow us to compare different place structures with each other through the304
medium of their respective well-mixed populations; making it a fair compar-305
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ison not biased by the different group sizes. In this section we shall only con-306
sider independent processes, as such comparisons are harder in other cases.307
We will call a comparison between a given place model and a well-mixed308
population fair if the mean group size of the two situations is the same.309
What do we mean by a well-mixed population? In the game theoretical310
literature concerning pairwise games, a well-mixed population is one where311
any pair of individuals is equally likely to meet, so that for any given individ-312
ual its opponent is equally likely to be any other individual. This idea can313
be generalised so that a well-mixed population means one where any group314
of size k is equally likely to meet; however this says nothing about the rela-315
tive likelihood of groups of size k and j 6= k forming. In the context of our316
models, a well mixed population is one where all individuals move following317
an identical distribution over the places (i.e. pn1,m = pn2,m for all n1, n2,m).318
These movements need not be independent; for instance in pairwise games319
each contest only involves two players, so knowing that a given player is in-320
volved necessarily reduces the chance of the involvement of a given second321
player (and so such a situation is not row independent according to our defi-322
nition from Appendix A). As we are only considering independent processes323
here, there is a natural interpretation of well-mixedness in this case; namely324
that in addition to all individuals having an identical distribution over the325
places, they all move independently of each other.326
This does not fully specify a unique well-mixed distribution, and to make327
fair comparisons it would be convenient to do so. We have already specified328
that all individuals are equivalent, and if we extend this to all places being329
equivalent also (i.e. pn,m1 = pn,m2) then this gives the required uniqueness.330
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Here we shall say that a population is completely mixed if and only if there is331
a p such that pn,m = p for all n,m. Note that a population of N individuals332
and M places is completely mixed if and only if pn,m = 1/M . Yet, to allow333
any plausible mean group size associated with any population size, at this334
point we generalize and allow our parameter p to take any value between 0335
and 1. This could be achieved in our framework by going beyond the idea336
of a fixed number of places (e.g. by letting there be M or M + 1 available337
places at any particular time, according to a given probability).338
Assume a well mixed population with pn,m = p and consider a fixed focal339
individual (at any place). It is clear that the number of other individuals340
at the same place as our focal individual follows the binomial distribution341
with parameters N − 1 and p, Bin(N − 1, p). The mean group size is thus342
1 + (N − 1)p (including the focal individual).343
In making comparisons with well-mixed populations, our aim is to match344
the mean group sizes. The right well-mixed population corresponds to a345
unique (usually non-integer) number of places, that will not generally be the346
number of places in the structured game. The appropriate number of places347
is thus not fixed in advance, and in principle we could define a distribution348
of the number of places M , ranging from 1 to ∞, which gives the precise349
binomial distribution that we have.350
We discuss the logical consistency of our model with existing concepts of351
well-mixedness and pairwise contests in Appendix C.352
5.2. A simple example353
Consider a star graph of three vertices (equivalent to a line with three354
vertices), using the territorial raider model, with parameters λ = 1/2 and355
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µ = 1/3. We will first calculate the group distributions. The probability of356
all three individuals being in the same group is357
P3 =
1
3
×
(
1
2
)2
=
1
12
(41)
and they can meet only at the centre. Similarly there will be one group of358
two and one group of one with probability359
P2,1 =
1
3
×
(
1
2
)2
(2 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2) =
8
12
. (42)
Finally, there will be three groups of single individuals with probability360
P1,1,1 =
1
3
×
(
1
2
)2
(1 + 1 + 1) =
3
12
. (43)
Hence, the probability of a randomly placed individual ending up in a group361
of size 3, 2 and 1 respectively is362
P|G|=3 =
1
12
, (44)
P|G|=2 =
8
12
×
2
3
=
4
9
, (45)
P|G|=1 =
8
12
×
1
3
+
3
12
=
17
36
. (46)
The mean group size is thus 29/18.363
How do we find a fair comparable completely mixed population for this364
case? We need 29/18 = 1 + 2p and thus p = 11/36. Note that this yields365
the probability that the number in the focal group from the corresponding366
well-mixed population will be367
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P cm|G|=3 =
(
11
36
)2
, (47)
P cm|G|=2 = 2
11
36
25
36
, (48)
P cm|G|=1 =
(
25
36
)2
. (49)
5.3. A comparison using a multi-player Hawk-Dove game368
Consider the multi-player Hawk-Dove game. We will compare the ex-369
ample on the star introduced in Section 4.1 with the equivalent well-mixed370
population. First, we must consider a completely mixed population where371
the number of an individual’s groupmates follows a Bin(N − 1, p) distribu-372
tion, and each individual plays a mixed strategy with probability of playing373
Hawk α as before.374
The reward to a Hawk EH is governed only by the number of Hawks375
present (Doves flee, so are equivalent to individuals which do not join the376
group). The reward to a Dove can be found by summing over all of the possi-377
bilities of other individuals playing Hawk, playing Dove or being absent.This378
reward is zero unless there are no Hawks present. Thus, similarly to (31)-(32)379
we get380
25
EH =
N−1∑
h=0
(
N − 1
h
)
(pα)h(1− pα)N−h−1
V − hC
h+ 1
(50)
=
(
1− (1− pα)N
Npα
)
V + C
(
−1 +
1− (1− pα)N
Npα
)
, (51)
ED =
N−1∑
d=0
(
N − 1
d
)
((1− α)p)d(1− p)N−d−1
V
d+ 1
(52)
=
(
(1− αp)N − (1− p)N
N(1− α)p
)
V. (53)
Assuming that it is mixed (i.e. not pure Hawk), the unique ESS is obtained381
by equating (51) and (53) giving382
V
C
= (1− α)
Nαp− 1 + (1− αp)N
1− (1− αp)N − α(1− (1− p)N)
. (54)
We now go back to the example game on the star with N = 5, V = 1, C =383
2. As shown in Table 1, the mean group size from the star was 1.92, so that384
the fair comparison here equates 1.92 with 1 + (N − 1)p, giving p = 0.23.385
Inserting these values in (54) we find that the ESS value is α = 0.394.386
Thus the star graph has a lower Hawk proportion than the equivalent387
completely mixed population. This is because the graph has a higher prob-388
ability of small and large groups, compared to the completely mixed popu-389
lation having a higher probability of intermediate groups i.e. the group size390
on the star graph is more variable. This is more damaging to Hawks than391
Doves as Doves do well when they are alone but do not suffer from being in392
large groups, whereas Hawks can pay large costs in large groups.393
We can illustrate this point about variability by the following. If we set394
p = 1/N in the limit as N → ∞ for our Binomial distribution, we get the395
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limiting Poisson (1) distribution, which has a mean group size of 2 (the focal396
individual and one other). The payoffs become397
ED =
V
1− α
(e−α − e−1), EH =
V
α
(1− e−α) + C(−1 +
1
α
(1− e−α)). (55)
The unique ESS for such a completely mixed population with random group398
sizes when V = 1 and C = 2 is 0.364 which is much smaller than the399
equivalent value of α = 0.5 when the group size is fixed at two.400
6. Discussion401
In this paper we have developed a new modelling framework to consider402
the interaction of individuals in a non-homogeneous environment. Individ-403
uals (or groups) move at successive time points to different “places” where404
they may interact with no, one or more than one other. Its most natural405
interpretation, and the one we have focused on here, is that of a spatial rela-406
tionship between individuals, so that some can go to some places but not to407
others. Individuals that are closer are then more likely to meet. The main408
advantages of the new framework are the capability to analyse and com-409
pare different spatial structures, its flexibility and the potential to consider410
both overlapping space use and multiplayer interactions just as easily as well-411
defined boundaries and multiple pairwise interactions. These features can set412
the framework apart from alternatives, which may be less flexible and overly413
complex in analysing the influence of spatial structure, multiplayer games414
and spatial overlap.415
This framework has some similarities with the concept of evolutionary416
graph theory, where the relationships between individuals are given by a417
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graph. There individuals interact in a pairwise fashion only, through the418
edges of the graph (though see [20] which we discuss below). In our framework419
any number of individuals can theoretically interact, depending upon the420
nature of the structure involved.421
Our framework does not include the definition of new games in general,422
and we incorporate existing game theoretical models into our structure. Since423
multiple individuals can meet, we can incorporate multiplayer models in424
such complex structures for the first time. One reason for doing this, as425
for pairwise games on graphs, is to investigate how a particular population426
structure may affect the evolutionary process which is governed by particular427
game theoretical interactions. So just as in evolutionary graph models where428
researchers investigate the structural effect on the evolution of cooperation429
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, we may investigate the evolution of the level of430
aggressiveness in a multi-player Hawk-Dove game, as we do in Section 5.3.431
A key influence on the outcome of multiplayer games is the number of432
players involved. Thus if one structure generates different size groups to433
another, then this can have a significant effect just through the sizes of the434
groups generated. Such a group size effect certainly occurs for the multiplayer435
Hawk-Dove game, for example. This is certainly of interest, but we are also436
interested in effects caused by structural relationships between the individu-437
als. To consider this properly, we have defined the idea of “fair comparisons”438
between different models, which requires the mean group size in each case439
to be the same. When considering evolutionary games on graphs there is440
not the same problem, as all games are pairwise. We note, however, that in441
this case there is the related feature of the degree of a vertex, the number442
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of connections of an individual, and graph models are often compared using443
different types of graphs with the same average degree.444
As well as using existing game models, there is also a natural way to445
develop new game models in the context of our framework; namely to have446
the strategies of the individuals related to their probability to move to a447
given place. Thus an animal may decide to go to one place and not another,448
which will not affect any interactions given that they occur, but will affect449
the likelihood of any given interaction occurring.450
When modelling using evolutionary games on graphs, games played with451
other individuals through the population structure leads to each individual452
acquiring a fitness, and as we have seen, exactly the same occurs in our453
framework as well. For evolutionary graph theory, the next step is for the454
population to evolve following some appropriately defined dynamics. For ex-455
ample, the invasion process (IP) selects a random individual according to its456
fitness, and this individual then replaces a randomly chosen neighbour with457
a copy of itself. We have not considered dynamics in this paper, but we could458
use very similar dynamics to those used in evolutionary graph theory. For ex-459
ample, an analogy of the IP would again pick an individual to reproduce with460
a probability proportional to its fitness, and then groups could be reformed461
at random, following the original procedure, and a random groupmate then462
be selected to be replaced. It is clear that the question of dynamics in such463
processes needs serious consideration. The purpose of the current paper,464
however, was to introduce a framework for modelling interaction within a465
population, and so we leave the consideration of dynamics to later work.466
We should note here that an evolutionarily stable strategy is a static467
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concept suited to large populations, and can be used in our context on the468
assumption that the population consists of a large number of similar territo-469
rial structures, with sufficient mixing between them. To consider evolution470
in finite populations fully, we would need to consider the precise nature of471
the dynamics. This will be an important priority in the development of our472
framework, but as we explain earlier, is outside the scope of the current473
paper.474
Hinsch and Komdeur [21] consider an interesting model of territorial in-475
teraction, which relates to the interaction of intruders and defenders in Sec-476
tion 4.2. In their work, the cost of intrusion resulting from the defence by477
the territory owner must be severe to prevent significant intrusion and make478
the defence of a home territory worthwhile. Their direct contests are only479
between the owner and the intruder (and their model of fights is more so-480
phisticated than ours, which in this paper is used as an illustrative example481
rather than a comprehensive model). On the other hand, our model assumes482
that even two intruders can fight. A difference in the outcomes is that such483
intruder-intruder contests can make intruding ineffective when the number484
of neighbours is large without any need of increased defending by the owner485
(as needed in [21]).486
Adams [22] discusses a number of studies of territorial behaviour consid-487
ering the optimisation of territory area and shape. They discuss the spatial488
organisation of territories [see 23, 24, 25] where individuals must organise489
themselves within a habitat, where spatial division between individuals is490
flexible, but there are always territories with well-defined boundaries. Thus491
our model is more general, in the sense that it considers the possibility of492
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overlapping territories, and indeed this possibility, allowing multiple interac-493
tions, was a prime reason for developing the framework.494
van Veelen and Nowak [20] considered a model where individuals occupy495
the vertices on a circle graph with N vertices, and payoffs are evaluated496
by games played between all collections of n consecutive individuals on the497
cycle. Thus in effect there are N possible groups of size n and each form498
with probability 1/N . This fits into our framework and is an example of a499
history-independent, but not row-independent, model with N −n+1 places,500
where a herd of n move to place 1 and others move singly to places 2 to501
N−n+1 with no background reward. They anaylsed multiplayer versions of502
some classical games of cooperation such as the stag hunt game and public503
goods games, and found in general that cooperation was harder to achieve504
the larger the groups involved, but under certain circumstances it was easier505
to achieve on the circle than in a well-mixed population, which is broadly506
consistent with results for two-player games, where structure generally helps507
the evolution of cooperation.508
As we have stated, an important feature of our framework is its flexi-509
bility. Nevertheless, in the examples considered in the independent model,510
the fundamental relationship between individuals and the overall habitat is511
constant, and truly dynamic aspects of behaviour are absent. Thus if animal512
interactions or seasonal changes lead to changing the distribution of indi-513
viduals over a habitat and there are strong temporal correlations for where514
an individual can move, quite complex dynamical behaviour could occur.515
This is a significant criticism of evolutionary graph models too. These can516
be included within more general models, for instance those which are nei-517
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ther history-indpendent nor row-independent. In its fullest generality our518
framework would be very complex, and so to model such situations some519
intermediate level models should be used. We have given a brief indication520
of some of these in Appendix A.521
We note that although we have focused on territorial behaviour, our522
framework relates to many other situations. For example the model of [20]523
considers the evolution of cooperation on a simple structured population,524
and as this is a special case of our framework, it is clear that our framework525
can be valuable in investigating the evolution of cooperative behaviour in526
general. Another example is the complex interactions within animal social527
groups, for instance ungulates such as goats or sheep, but especially primate528
groups. Family and dominance relationships within these groups mean that529
interactions between some collections of individuals are more likely than oth-530
ers, and often contests for dominance will feature multiple individuals, often531
in complex alliances. A discussion of this, and a mathematical model, was532
developed in [26].533
It will be of great interest to see how different types of structure affect534
key evolutionary properties of populations. For example, in Section 5.3 we535
see that the heterogeneous star graph induces a lower level of aggression than536
the homogeneous well mixed population in the Hawk-Dove game. The pri-537
mary cause of this is that the star graph caused more variability in the size538
of groups which met, and this had the consequence of making the aggressive539
Hawk strategy less profitable. This leads to the question of whether spatial540
structure of biological populations is a key factor in the variability of the541
sizes of groups, and is this variability in turn a key predictor of important542
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within-group behaviour such as the level of aggressiveness or cooperation?543
A second example is in the territorial raider model with strategic movement,544
where it can be more beneficial to invade other territories than defend your545
own when the degree of the graph is sufficiently low. Thus it would be inter-546
esting to investigate the preponderance of territory invasion based upon the547
number of neighbours (how to allow for such factors as territory size to make548
a fair comparison is an interesting question). This paper is only able at this549
stage to tentatively raise such questions, as we further develop the frame-550
work. An obvious starting point is the consideration of general multi-player551
games [27, 28, 29] within our framework. There is enduring interest in the552
evolution of cooperation [30, 31, 32] and it will be of considerable interest to553
see how different types of our more general structure affect the evolution of554
cooperation, in particular when multiplayer games are involved. Other pos-555
sibilities include more concrete biological behaviours, for instance we could556
consider models of kleptoparasitism [33, 34] or dominance hierarchies [35, 36]557
in an explicitly spatial context. The exploration of this framework is clearly558
still in its very early stages, and the range of possibilities is considerable.559
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Appendix A: Some concepts of independence671
As we saw in Section 2.1, a population distribution is history-independent672
if673
P (X(t) = x)(x<t) = P (X(t) = x). (56)
We call a history independent process homogeneous if the population distri-674
bution is independent of time i.e.675
P (X(s) = x) = P (X(t) = x) ∀s, t ≥ 1. (57)
A given population distribution may not be independent of the history of676
the process, but may depend only upon the most recent population distribu-677
tion. In this case we call the model Markov and we have678
P (X(t) = x)(x<t) = P (X(t) = x|X(t− 1) = xt−1), (58)
and we denote this quantity simply as P (X(t) = x)(xt−1). For a given in-679
dividual we analogously write pn,m,t(xt−1). Similarly a Markov process is680
homogeneous if681
P (X(s) = x)(xs−1) = P (X(t) = x)(xt−1) ∀s, t ≥ 1. (59)
It is possible that each individual in the population moves independently682
of what others do at that time point, so can only move conditionally on what683
has happened in the past, then for any m1,m2 we have684
P (Xn1,m1(t) = 1 & Xn2,m2(t) = 1)(x<t) = pn1,m1,t(x<t)pn2,m2,t(x<t). (60)
39
In this case we call the model row-independent. We note that this will not685
necessarily be the case, for instance if the animals move in groups such as686
herds, if individuals actively exclude conspecifics or if they follow a strategy687
of opportunistic intrusion when a conspecific is absent. We also note that the688
alternative concept of column-independence can never occur, as knowledge of689
the occupants of one place necessarily gives information about the occupancy690
of others.691
If the process is both row independent and history independent then the692
probability of an individual visiting a place depends only upon the individual,693
the place and the time so that694
pn,m,t(x<t) = pn,m,t ∀n,m, t,x<t. (61)
If in addition the process is homogeneous then695
pn,m,t(x<t) = pn,m ∀n,m, t,x<t. (62)
In this case we simply call the model independent, again as discussed in696
Section 2.1.697
Appendix B: General results for the boundary interaction model698
In the boundary interaction model of Section 3.2, let A = (Ai,j) be the699
adjacency matrix of the graph, i.e. Ai,j = 1 if there is an edge between Ii700
and Ij and Ai,j = 0 otherwise.701
Suppose that In has degree dn =
∑
j An,j, so its possible groups are702
either {In} (it is alone, which can occur on any boundary of its territory), or703
{In, In′} (two individuals meet on the common boundary of their territories)704
for each of the dn individuals In′ such that An,n′ = 1.705
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It is possible that an individual is more likely to move to one boundary706
than another (e.g. if the boundaries vary in size), as is the case in Figure 3.707
Supposing that this is not the case, and each boundary is visited with equal708
probability, we get pn,{n,n′} = An,n′/dn. Hence, assuming that the reward for709
a given individual being alone does not depend upon which boundary of its710
territory it is at, we obtain711
Rn =
∑
n′
An,n′
dn
Reward from going to P{n,n′} (63)
=
∑
n′
An,n′
dn
(
1
dn′
fn,{n,n′} + (1−
1
dn′
)fn,{n}
)
(64)
= fn,{n} +
∑
n′
An,n′
1
dn
1
dn′
[
fn,{n,n′} − fn,{n}
]
(65)
where fn,{n} is the payoff when alone, which can perhaps be regarded as the712
background fitness and fn,{n,n′} is the payoff when being with individual n
′.713
We note here that this reward function is different to those usually used714
when modelling games on graphs. One common reward function is the total715
reward [37, 38], where an individual plays a game against each of its neigh-716
bours and the overall reward is the sum of the payoffs of all of these games.717
The reward to individual In then is given by718
Rtn =
∑
n′
Ann′fn,{n,n′}. (66)
Why should individuals gain rewards only when meeting others, and these719
rewards be cumulative? Perhaps when individuals meet they swap informa-720
tion, so the more information that is obtained the better for the individual.721
An alternative reward function is the average reward, where an individual722
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plays all of its neighbours [39, 40], but its reward is the average of the payoffs723
from these games i.e.724
Rmn =
∑
n′
1
dn
Ann′fn,{n,n′}. (67)
In this case, perhaps the information obtained takes time to use, and that725
time is split evenly between all of the pieces of information obtained (e.g.726
when two bees meet and one communicates the location of flowers to the727
other). We contend that our version of the fitness function Rn is the more728
natural fitness function for most situations, and that more attention needs729
to be paid to the fitness function used for any particular game.730
We note that for regular graphs, the three fitness functions described731
above are effectively the same differing only in the addition of an arbitrary732
constant to all payoffs, but that for irregular graphs there are significant dif-733
ferences between the three. It is already well known that Rtn and R
m
n can734
yield very different results; this is easy to see, since, assuming payoffs are735
always positive, the better connected vertices will have relatively higher fit-736
nesses under Rtn than R
m
n . Similarly if the payoff to being alone is larger than737
for being in any larger group, for example, which is reasonable in many for-738
aging situations, individuals on the most connected vertices will have highest739
fitness under Rtn but lowest fitness under Rn.740
Appendix C: Our framework in the completely mixed limit741
Let us consider a population playing pairwise games within a well mixed742
population, but where groups are formed using our completely mixed pop-743
ulation, so each other individual is independently in the same group as our744
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focal individual with probability p (which may or may not correspond to a745
fixed number of places M , with p = 1/M). Thus746
P (G : where |G| = k) = pk−1(1− p)N−k k = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1. (68)
As games are simple pairwise ones, these can be played within a group by747
picking a random opponent from the group for each individual, or, equiva-748
lently, averaging the payoffs gained by playing all the others in a group. This749
gives a mean reward to In within a group Gi, |Gi| = k, of750
R(n|Gi) =
1
k − 1
∑
n′ 6=n∈G
R(n,n′). (69)
Thus an individual’s total average fitness using the above formula is751
∑
k
∑
G,|G|=k
pk−1(1− p)N−k
1
k − 1
∑
n′ 6=n∈G
R(n,n′). (70)
Each other individual is in precisely
(
N−2
k−2
)
groups of size k that also involve752
our focal individual, so (70) becomes753
R(n) =
∑
k
pk−1(1− p)N−k
1
k − 1
(
N − 2
k − 2
)∑
n′ 6=n
R(n,n′) (71)
=
1
N − 1
∑
n′ 6=n
R(n,n′) (72)
which is the mean payoff in the well-mixed population for pairwise games.754
Thus our framework is consistent with standard results for pairwise games.755
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